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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computer systems are growing in complexity and sophistication as multiprocessors and distributed com-
puters are coming into widespread use to achieve highcr performance and reliability. This growth is being
assisted by the availability of successively more complex building blocks. This trend has increased the im-
portance of fault tolerance and system reliability as design parameters. Thus the computation of system
reliability measures has become one of the system design tasks. Several efforts have been reported in the
literature and are in progress to make the task of computing system reliability measures easier and more
efficient by providing designers with reliability evaluation tools.
The analysis and evaluation of system reliability for complex computer systems is very tedious and prone
to error even for experienced reliability analysts. With the exc0ption of the ADVISER I)rogram, discussed
in Section 1.2, existiug software tools usually assume an understanding of reliability analysis techniques
and therefore are more in the nature of computational aids once the preliminary system decomposition
and analysis has been manually achieved. Although ADVISER does not make this assumption it. uses
combinatorial techniques and is therefore limited in the complexity of systems and fault types it can analyze.
More advanced techniques are required to analyze computer architectures that use standby redundancy,
can be repaired, and are susceptible to transient or intermittent faults. One possibility is the Markov model,
discussed in Section 1.1. The advantages offered by Markov models are that they are in widespread use
among reliability analysts and several programs, discussed in Section 1.2, have been developed to solve
them.However,Markovmodelscannotbeusedto analyzenonexponentiallydistributedconcurrent events.
For example, a fault I.h_t arrives while f.hc syst,'m is n'c_mliguring ils,'lf around a pn'vious fault wonld be
represented by a transition to a state where two faults are present. This new state would not. take into
account the time the system already spent reconfiguring from the first fault.
Another possibility is the extended stochastic Petri net (ESPN) described in [DTGN84]. The advantages
offered by the ESPN is that it can analyze concurrent events and model systems at a lower level of detail than
Markov models. The ESPN "tokens" can be simultaneously enabled to move concurrently at independent
transition times. The low level modeling capability is due l.o mechanisms such as queues and counters that
can simulate the algorithm of the process being modeled. To solve an ESPN analytically or numerically it
must be converted to a Markov model. This conversion is not possible if tokens are moving concurrently
at independent transition times that are not exponentially distributed, because this makes the process non-
Markovian (i.e., the transition probabilities depend on past. states). In general an ESPN must be solved by
simulation.
Simulations can include any level of detail, and are thus flexible, but many repetitions of the simulation
are needed to ensure accuracy. For example, in life critical applications that require a probability of failure
of 10 -9 with a relative error no more than 10% within a confidence interval of 95%, approximately 3.8 × 1011
simulation repetitions are necessary [LS86]. In general those applications require a Markov model because
it can be solved analytically or numerically.
The purpose of this paper is to present a general graphical user interface (GUI) for automatic reliability
modeling of processor-memory-switch (PMS) structures using a Markov model so that it can be used for
life critical applications. This GUI is based on a hierarchy of windows iml)lemeilted in C using the TAE
Plus user interface development tool for building X window-based applications [Szc90]. One window has
graphical editing capabilities for specifying the system's communication structure, hierarchy, reconfiguration
capabilities, and requirements. This window is implemeuted using the schematic drawing editor Schem
[Vii90]. Other windows have text fields, pop-up menus, and buttons for specifying parameters and selecting
actions. The advantages of such an approach are (a) utility to a larger class of users, not necessarily expert
in reliability analysis, and (b) a lower probability of human error in the computation.
A brief background on reliability calculation at the PMS level using Markov models is presented in
Section 1.1. Previous work in the generation and evaluation of reliability models is surveyed in Section 1.2.
The proposed GUI is defined and illustrated in Chapter 2. An example application of the GUI is presented
in Chapter 3 using the Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor (FTMP) described in [LS83]. Conclusions are drawn
in Chapter 4.
1.1 Background
Present day computer systems can be viewed at varying levels of detail, and therefore so can the process
of designing and analyzing them. Four levels were defined in [SBN82]. These range from the circuit level,
through the logic and programming levels, to the PMS level. The PMS level view of digital systems is one
where the primitives are processors, memories, switches, transducers, etc. as opposed to the logic level where
the primitives may be gates, registers, multiplexers, etc.
Hardware components are susceptible to hard and soft faults as discussed in [SS82]. A fault is an
incorrect state of hardware or software resulting from a physical change in the hardware, interference from
the environment, or design mistakes [Lap85]. Hard or permanent faults are continuous and stable, and result
from an irreversible physical change. Soft faults can be transient or intermittent. Transient faults result from
temporary environmental conditions. Intermittent faults are occasionally active due to unstable hardware,
or varying hardware or software states (e.g., as a function of load or activity). Depending on whether the
intermittent fault is benign or active the output of the component will be correct or not, respectively.
Fault-tolerant computer systems can be affected by a limited set of faults without interruptions in their
operation. Some computer systems achieve fault tolerance by using redundant groups of components to
perform the same operations. The system must determine which is the correct output using diagnostics
or majority voting. The various redundancy techniques are discussed in [SS82], the more relevant ones are
defined below.
Static redundancy. Faults are masked through a majority vote involving a fixed group of redundant
components. Thus, when the masking redundancy is exhausted by component failures, any further
faultswill cause rrorsat theoutput.Figure1.1illustratesa statically redundant processor triad.
Dynamic redundancy. Faults are not masked from causing errors at tile output, hut the faulty compo-
ncnts are detected, isolated, and reeonfigured out of lhe system. Tile f_iulty components are replaced
when spares are available. Figure 1.2 illustrates a dynamically redundant active processor with n
spares.
Hybrid redundancy. Faults are masked through a majority vote involving a group of redundant compo-
nents that is reconfigured when spares are available. Thus, wlmn the masking redundancy is exhausted
by component failures, any filrther faults that occur before a faulty component is replaced by a spare
will cause errors at the output. Figure 1.3 illustrates a hybridly redundant triad of active processors
with n spares.
Adaptive voting. Faults are masked through a majority vote involving a variable group of redundant
components without spares. Faulty components are reconfigured out of the system by excluding them
from the voting process. Thus, when the masking redtmdancy is exhausted by component failures,
any further faults that occur before a faulty component is reconfigured out of the voting process will
cause errors at the output. Figure 1.4 illustrates adaptive voting with n processors.
Adaptive hybrid. Faults are masked through a majorily vote involving a variable group of redundant
components which are replaced when spares are available. If spares are not available, faulty components
are reconfigured out of the system by excluding them from the voting process. Thus, when the
masking redundancy is exhausted by component failures, an)' further faults that occur before a faulty
component is replaced by a spare or reconfigured out of the voting process will cause errors at the
output. Figure 1.5 illustrates an adaptive hybrid n-tuple of active processors with m spares.
For example, if a triad (a group of 3 componeuts) that uses hyl)rid redundancy "recovers" from a fault
by replacing the faulty component with a spare, it can then tolerate a second fault. Recovery is the process
of detecting, isolating, and reconfiguring the faulty conlponeut OUl of the system. The fault, coverage of
a component is the probability that the system can survive a fault in this component and successfldly
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Figure 1.1: A statically redundant processor triad,
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Figure 1.2: A dynamically redundant active processor with n spares.
D
Figure 1.3: A hybridly redundant triad of active processors with n spares.
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Figure 1.4: Adaptive voting with n processors.
Figure t.5: An adaptive hybrid n-tul)le of active processors with rn spares.
recover)If the system can always recover it has a "perfect" coverage of one.
Spares are sometimes left unpowered until they become part of the active configuration to reduce their
failure rates [AGM+71]. They are sometimes said to be: cold if their failure rates are assumed to be zero,
warm if their failure rates are reduced but not zero, or hot if their failure rates are not reduced [BJ90].
Reliability measures are defined in terms of probabilities because the failure processes in hardware com-
ponents are nondeterministic. These various measures are discussed in [SS82], the more relevant ones are
defined below.
Reliability. The conditional probability, R(t), as a function of time t that the system has survived the
interval [0, t] given that it was operational at time zero. It is a nonincreasing function whose initial
value is one.
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). The expected time of the first system failure assuming a new (perfect)
system at time zero.
Availability. The probability, A(t), as a function of time t that the system is operational at that instant
of time t.
If the limit of A(f) exists as f goes to infinity, it expresses the expected fraction of time that the system
is available to perform useful computations. Availability is typically used as a figure of merit in systems
in which service can be delayed or denied for short periods to perform preventive maintenance or repair
without serious consequences. The availability is important in the computation of system life-cycle costs.
Reliability is used to describe systems in which repair is typically infeasible such as aerospace applications.
The MTTF can be derived from R(t) as follows:
f0 °
MTTF = R(t) dt
The most commonly used reliability function for a single component is based on a Poisson process with
1 These are the definitions that will be used in this paper, but recovery mid coverage do not have universally accepted
definitions.
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anexponentialdistribution.Thisis calledtheexponentialreliabilityfunctionandhastheform:
R(O = e-_'
where ,_ is the hazard or failure rate. The failure rate is a constant which reflects the reliability of the
component and for highly reliable components is usually expressed in failures per million hours. The expo-
nential reliability function is used when the failure rate is time-independent, such as when components do
not age. It is often observed that, after a burn-in period, permanent faults in electronic components follow
a relatively constant failure rate. The MTTF for tile exponential reliability function has the form:
l
MTTF = -
A
Many other reliability functions have been formulated. The second most common reliability function is
based on the Weibull distribution. This is called the Weibull reliability function and has the form:
R(t) = e -(xO°
where _ is the scale parameter and a is the shape parameter (other reparameterized forms are also common).
It is equivalent to the exponential function when a is one. The Weibull reliability function is used when
the failure rate is time-dependent. Permanent faults for components that age can be described using an
increasing failure rate (c_ > 1) and in this case the system is not as good as new when repair takes place.
Data presented in [McC81, CMS82] indicates that transient faults follow a decreasing failure rate (a < 1).
The failure processes of different components will be assumed to be independent of each other. This
assumption is not strictly true, such as when electrical, mechanical, or thermal conditions in one component
affect other components in its proximity. However, it is close enough in practice to be used to simplify the
analysis.
The state of a system represents all that must be known to describe the system at any instant. As the
system changes, such as when components fail or are repaired, so does its state. These changes of state
are called state transitions. If all possible states are assumed to be known a discrete-state system model is
used; if this assumption is not made a continuous-state system model is used. If the state transition times
are assumed to be restricted to some multiple of a given time interval a discrete-time system model is used.
If it is assumed that state transitions can occur at any time a continuous-time system model is used. Most
systems can be classified according to their state space and time parameter as
a) discrete-state and discrete-time
b) discrete-state and continuous-time
c) continuous-state and discrete-time
d) continuous-state and continuous-time
For a discrete-state system a state transition diagram (STD) may be drawn. The transition diagram
is a directed graph. The nodes correspond to system states, and the directed arcs indicate allowable state
transitions. Each arc has a label that identifies tile distribution of the conditional probability that the
system will go from the originating node to the destination node of that directed arc given the previous
history of the system and that the system was initially at the originating node. The label used depends
on the distribution. For example, the label could be the hazard rate for the exponential distribution, the
scale and shape parameters for the Weibull distribution, or the mean and standard deviation for a general
distribution.
If transitions are allowed from failed states to operational states, then the STD is an Availability graph
and A(t) may be obtained from it. R(t) may be obtained by specifically disallowing failed to working state
transitions from the STD, thus making it a Reliability graph.
A Reliability graph of a triad is given in Figure 1.6. In this model it is a.ssumed that the components
have a perfect coverage of 1. The horizontal transitions represent fault arrivals. These follow an exponential
distribution, and consequently A represents the constant hazard rate. The coefficients of ), represent the
number of working processors that are being actively used in tile configuration. The vertical transition
represents recovery from a fault. These follow a general distributionl and consequently p and _r represent
its mean and standard deviation. There is a race between the two transitions leaving state 2. If the second
Key:StateDescription
1 3working
2 2working
3 systemfailed
4 2 working,uses1
5 systemfailed
3_
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Figure 1.6: Reliability graph of a triad.
fault wins the race, then system failure occurs. If the removal of the first fault wins the race, then the system
reconfigures into a simplex (i.e., only uses one of the two working components). Unless otherwise noted in
the state descriptions, all working processors are being actively used in the configuration.
The information conveyed by the STD is often summarized in a square matrix called the state transition
matrix (STM). The STM element in row i and column j is the label in the arc from state i to state j.
Tile terminology used in this paper to denote the various types of Markov models, and tile assumptions
they are based on are defined below. The hierarchy of Markov models is illustrated in Figure 1.7.
Markov model. A stochastic process model whose future state depends only upon the present state, and
not upon the history that led to its present state.
Homogeneous Markov model. A Markov model whose state transition probabilities are time-
independent. For the continuous-time homogeneous Markov model this implies that the state transi-
tion times follow an exponential distribution. This type of model is discussed in [Chu67, Rom70] and
applied to computer systems in [MA82].
l0
Markovmodel
homogeneous semi-(time-indepe dent) 1 [ Q_o.cal time-dependent)I [ n°nh°m°gene°us(globaltime- dependent) ]1
Figure 1.7: lIierarchy of Marko,, models.
Semi-Markov model. A Markov model whose state transition probabilities depend upon the time spent
in the present state, called the local time. For the continuous-time semi-Markov model this implies
that the state transition times do not follow an exponential distribution, they might follow a Weibull
distribution or any other distribution. This type of model is discussed and applied to computer systems
in [WhiS4].
Nonhomogeneous Markov model. A Markov model whose state transition probabilities depend upon
the time since the system was first put into operation, called the global time. For the continuous-
time nonhomogeneous Markov model this implies that the state transition times do not follow an
exponential distribution. Often they are assumcd to follow a Weibull distribution, but they can follow
any other distribution. This type of model is discussed and applied to computer systems in [TGS1].
The probability of being in a particular state for a discrete-state, continuous-time Markov model can
be expressed with a differential equation. The set of simultaneous differential equations that describe these
models are called the continuous-time Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. For homogeneous Markov models
these equations can be solved using matrix or Laplace transformations.
If the state transition probabilities are time-dependent, it may be quite difficult to obtain explicit solu-
tions to the continuous-time Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. To obtain the exact probability of reaching
a state through a particular path of transitions requires the solution of a multiple integral, where each
intcgral represents the probability of making one of the transitions in the path. Often the integrals are ap-
proximated using numerical integration techniques [SBG79]. An alternative method is to approximate the
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continuous-timemodelwithdiscrete-timeequivalents[SS82].Themajordifficultywith the second method is
that many transition rates that are effectively zero in the continuous-time model assume small, but nonzero,
probabilities in a discrete-time model.
1.2 Previous Work
There are several programs that use Markov models to evaluate the reliability and/or availability of systems
that use standby redundancy or can be repaired, and are susceptible to hard, transient, and intermittent
faults, such as CARE III, ARIES, SURE, PAWS, STEM, SURF, and IIARP. All of these programs can
evaluate reliability. ARIES, SURF, and HARP can also evaluate availability. Except for CARE III, they all
have as one of the system specification methods the state transition matrix.
CARE III (Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation), described in [BPR84], can evaluate the reliability
of systems that use reconfiguration to tolerate component faults, but do not repair the faulty components.
It uses a behavioral decomposition/aggregation solution technique described in [TG81]. This technique as-
sumes that the fault-occurrence behavior is composed of relatively infrequent events while the fault-handling
behavior is composed of relatively frequent events. The fault-handling behavior is separately analyzed us-
ing a fixed semi-Markov model that can use exponential and uniform distributions. The fault occurrence
behavior is analyzed using an aggregate nonhomogeneous Markov model that can use exponential and
Weibull distributions. The fault handling behavior is reflected by parameters in the aggregate nonhomo_
geneous Markov model. Numerical integration techniques are used to solve these Markov models. The
fault-occurrence behavior is specified using extended fault trees, which are automatically converted to the
nonhomogeneous Markov model. The fault-handling behavior is specified by providing the transition pa-
rameters of the fixed semi-Markov model. CARE III was developed at Raytheon under NASA's Langley
Research Center sponsorship. It is written in FORTRAN 77 and runs on Cyber and VAX/VMS computers.
ARIES (Automated _.Reliability Interactive Estimation .System), described in [MAG82], is restricted to
homogeneous Markov models. The system can be specified using a state transition matrix or as a series of
independent subsystems each containing identical modules that are either active or serve as spares. It uses a
matrix transformation solution technique that assumes distinct eigenvalues for the state transition matrix.
12
It wasdevelopedat UCLAandrunsonaVAX.
SURE(Semi-MarkovUnreliability Range _.Evaluator), described in [BW88], evaluates the unreliability
upper and lower bounds of semi-Markov models. It uses new mathematical theorems proven in [Whi84,
Lee85]. These theorems provide a means of bounding the probability of traversing a specific path in the
model within a specified time. By applying the theorems to every path of the model, the probability of
the system reaching any death state can be determined within usually very close bounds. These theorems
assume that slow (with respect to the mission time) exponential transitions describe tile occurrence of faults
and fast traasitions, that follow a general distribution specified by its mean and standard deviation, describe
the recovery process. It provides the option of pruning the model during its evaluation by conservatively
assuming system failure once the probability of reaching a state falls below a specified or automatically
selected prune level. Faults can be modeled as permanent, transient, or intermittent. Its only input method
is the state transition matrix. SURE was developed at NASA's Langley Research Center. It is written in
Pascal and runs on VAX/VMS and SUN computers.
The PAWS (Pad_ Approximation With Scaling) and STEM (Scaled Taylor Exponential Matrix) pro-
grams, described in [BS88], evaluate the unreliability of homogeneous Markov models. The input language
for these two programs is essentially tile same as for the SURE program. PAWS and STEM were developed
at NASA's Langley Research Center. They are written in Pascal and FORTRAN 77 and run on VAX/VMS
and SUN computers.
SURF, described in [LL78], can solve semi-Markov models that use exponential distributions or non-
exponential distributions that are related to the exponential (e.g., Gamma, Erlang, etc.). The method of
stages [CM65] is used to produce a homogeneous Markov model. Matrix transformations are used to obtain
time-independent values, such as MTTF and the limiting availability. The Laplace transform is used to
obtain time-dependent values, such as availability and reliability. SURF was developed in Toulouse, France.
Written in PL/I, it runs on an IBM System/370 at the IBM research facility in Yorktown Heights, New
York.
For HARP (ILvbrid Automated Reliability Predictor) described in [DTSG86, HBH90], the state tran-
sition probabilities can have exponential, uniform, Weibull, or general (a histogram must be provided)
13
distributions.If thestatetransition matrix is given by the user, tIARP can only evaluate the availability of
systems with constant repair rates. HARP has several additional methods of specifying the fault-occurrence
behavior (e.g., fault trees), all of which are automatically converted to a nonhomogeneous Markov model.
The fault-handling behavior can also be specified by providing the transition parameters of one of sev-
eral models. It uses the same behavioral decomposition/aggregation solution technique as CARE III, but
the various models are solved in a hybrid fashion. Markov models are solved using numerical integration
techniques, and extended stochastic Petri nets are solved by simulation. HARP was developed at Duke
University and Clemson University under NASA's Langley Research Center sponsorship. It is written in
FORTRAN 77 and C, and runs on the following computers: VAX/VMS, SUN, and IBM compatible PCs.
An abstract specification language for Markov reliability models was described in [But85]. The language
has statements to specify: (a) the state space, by defining the state variables and their range; (b) the start
state, by the initial values of the state variables; (c) the death states, by a Boolean expression of the state
variables; and (d) the state transitions, by a set of if-then rules that define, in terms of the state variables,
the possible transitions, their rates, and their destination states. This language has been implemented in
the ASSIST (Abstract Semi-Markov_Specification Interface to the SURE Tool) program to generate Markov
reliability models in the SURE input language [Joh86]. This implementation provides three optional state
space reduction techniques. First is pruning the model during its generation by conservatively assuming
system failure once a state satisfies a prune condition specified as a Boolean expression of the slate variables
[Joh88]. Second is trimming the model by conservatively altering states with outgoing recovery transitions
[WP90]. Their outgoing failure transitions that do not go to death states are changed to go to a single
trim state. The third technique combines pruning and trimming by changing all states that meet a prune
condition to trim states. Each trim state has a single transition to a death state at some trim rate. The trim
rate must be the sum of the failure rates of all remaining components. ASSIST was developed at NASA's
Langley Research Center. It is written in Pascal and runs on VAX/VMS and SUN computers.
ADVISER (Advanced Interactive Symbolic__Evaluator of Reliability), described in [KS82], automatically
generates symbolic reliability fimctions for PMS structures. Its assumptions are: (a) all faults are permanent
and stochastically independefit, (b) the PMS system has a perfect coverage, and (c) failed components are
14
Program Name Primary Inputs Primary Outputs
CARE III fault tree and reliability estimate
semi-Markov model parameters
ARIES homogeneous Markov model reliabiiity or
availability estimate
SURE semi-Markov model reliability bounds
PAWS/STEM homogeneous Markov model reliability estimate
HARP fault tree or reliability or
nonhomogeneous Markov model availability estimate
ASSIST semi-Markov model specification semi-Markov model
ADVISER PMS structure symbolic reliability function
Table 1.1: Summary of previous work.
not repaired and returned to a nonfaulty state. Its primary input is the interconnection graph of the PMS
structure. Other program inputs describe the components of the PMS structure by their types, reliability
functions, internal port connections, and ability to communicate with components of the same type. The
program also takes as input the requirements for the system and its subsystems or clusters, in the form
of modified Boolean expressions. ADVISER was developed at CMU. It is written in BLISS and runs on a
PDP-10.
A summary of the programs described in this section is presented in Table 1.1 in terms of their primary
inputs and outputs. None of these programs is able to generate a Markov model or its specification from
the PMS structure.
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Chapter 2
Graphical User Interface
This GUI is to become the first of four steps in an automated reliability modeling process using a Markov
model. The second step will be automating the specification of the model in the ASSIST language. We
are implementing this second step in a program named ARM (Automated Reliability Modeling). The last
two steps, automating the generation and evaluation of the model, have already been implemented in the
ASSIST and SURE programs.
In order of importance, the major goals of the GUI are defined below.
General. New fault-tolerant techniques and system designs can be accommodated.
Hierarchical. Systems and subsystems can be defined in terms of their subsystems and components, re-
spectively.
Compact. Subsystem classes need only be defined with their component types as formal parameters once.
Subsystems are in the same class if they have the same hierarchy and requirements (e.g., triads which
require two of their three components). Subsystems are of the same type if they are in the same class, are
composed of the same component types, and have ttle same recovery parameters, if any (e.g., processor
triads). Components are of the same type if they have the same function and parameters (e.g., proces-
sors). These categories of subsystems and components arc summarized and ranked relative to each other in
Table 2.1. For the sake of generality, the GUI does not predefine any category.
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Category Common Attributes Rank
subsystem class hierarchy {[+++][+++][+++]}
requirements
subsystem type component types [+++]
recovery parameters
component type function -l-
parameters
Table 2.1: Categories of subsystems and components.
Major GUI Input Category Source
requirements application
architecture design
parameters implementation technology
Table 2.2: Sources of major GUI input categories.
Each category is represented by an identifier that starts with a letter and can contain letters, underscores
(_), and numbers (e.g., a processor could be represented by p). This identifier can be preceded by an
integer greater than one to represent multiple elements of the same category (e.g., two proce_ors could
be represented by 2p). A subsystem identifier can also end with a set of parentheses that enclose a list of
parameters separated by commas [e.g., T(p)]. Formal parameters, identifiers which are not used to represent
anything else, are used in the identifier of a subsystem class. Component types are used instead of the formal
parameters in the identifier of a subsystem type.
The system's description is divided into requirements, architecture, and parameters. The requirements
depend on the application of the system. How the system was designed determines the architecture. The
technology used to implement the system components determines the parameter values (e.g., failure rates).
Tile sources of the major GUI input categories are summarized in Table 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows the hierarchy
of the system description.
The GUI starts by displaying the main window shown in Figure 2.2. It contains: text fields for entering
the system name and the name of the current selection; the graphs, parameters, and model pull-down menus;
and a button to quit the GUI. The current selection is the initial name used by windows that describe a
component type, subsystem type, or reconfiguration. It changes automatically to the last name entered in
the first text field of any such window, but can also be changed manually.
The graphs menu, shown in Figure 2.3, displays a window for editing the graphs described in Section 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Main window.
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Reconfiguration
Requirement
Figure 2.3: Graphs menu.
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Figure 2.4: Parameters menu.
The parameters menu, shown in Figure 2.4, displays windows, with text fields and buttons for parameter
specification, which are described in Section 2.2. The model menu, shown in Figure 2.5, executes the
programs that will specify, generate, and evaluate the Markov model, based on the system description given
through the GUI. ARM will notify the user if the system description is incomplete (e.g., if some parameters
have not been specified).
2.1 Graphs
The following subsections describe the graphs used for specifying the system's communication structure,
hierarchy, reconfiguration capabilities, and requirements.
]Specify
Generate
......
Figure 2.5: Model menu.
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2.1.1 Structure
Graphs with unidirectional and bidirectional edges describe the system's communication structure. It. is
assumed that critical components, those required for the system to be operational, must bc able to com-
municate. The main purpose of the communication structure description is to analyze which component
failures will prevent communication between critical components and therefore cause system failure. This
structure is divided into external and internal.
2.1.1.1 External
A system's external structure is defined as the communication interconnection of all of its components. In the
external structure graph, the nodes represent one or more components of the same type. An unidirectional
edge between two nodes indicates that all the components of the source node can communicate with all the
components of the target node. A bidirectional edge between two nodes indicates that all the components
of one node can communicate with all the components of tile other node, and vice versa.
A plus sign (+) at the end of a component type identifier indicates that this is a self-talking component.
The majority of components of like type are passive and do not need to communicate. Examples of passive
components are memories, buses, and input/output transducers. Self-talking components need to exchange
information amongst each other. Examples of self-talking components are processors, direct-memory-access
device controllers, and other "smart" controllers. If not specified, the default is for components to be passive
and not communicate with their own type. This information is needed to prevent ARM from requiring
communication paths between components of the same type that never exchange information. Not taking
this behavior into account would lead to a pessimistic evaluation of the system reliability.
An asterisk (*) at the end of a component type identifier indicates that every communication port of
this component is internally connected bidirectionally to all other ports of the component. Most buses have
this internal structure. If not indicated in this way or as described in Subsubsection 2.1.1.2, the default is
for every port of a component to be disconnected from the other ports of the component.
The graph in Figure 2.6 describes the external structure of a multiprocessor composed of six processors
(p), six memories (m), six watchdog timers (w), four transmit buses (tb), four receive buses (rb), and four
2O
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Figure 2.6: External structure of a multiprocessor.
watchdog buses (wb). The processors and watchdog timers need to communicate with components of their
own type. The processors communicate through the memory as described in Subsubsection 2.1.1.2. The
watchdog timers communicate through the watchdog bus. All of the buses have the typical internal structure
described above. This multiprocessor will be used as a running example throughout this chapter.
2.1.1.2 Internal
A component's internal structure is defined as the communication interconnection of its ports. This iuterual
structure of one or more components can be described by a graph inside of a component with its external
port connections labeled on the outside of tile component. The absence of an edge between two ports
indicates that they can not communicate through this component.
The internal structure of the six memories is described by the graph in Figure 2.7. It indicates that the
processors can communicate through the memory.
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Figure 2.7: Internal structure of the six memory components.
2.1.2 Hierarchy
A system can have physical and/or logical hierarchies which contain physical and logical subsystems, respec-
tively. These hierarchies are different partial views of the same system; therefore, a component of a physical
subsystem may also be a component of a logical subsystem. The difference between a physical and a logical
subsystem is in their ability to be reconfigured and in how their failure affects the system's operation, as
explained in the next two subsubsections. If present, the system hierarchies (a) show what subsystems are
in the initial system configuration and (b) define the composition of the subsystems that may be part of
those hierarchies.
A group of components with their own set of requirements constitutes a subsystem. A subsystem can
also be composed of other subsystems. If a subsystem does not meet its requirements, then none of its
components are able to perform their function.
Redundant subsystems are composed of multiple components with the same function to increase their
reliability. Some of these redundant subsystems may be part of the initial system configuration, while others
serve as alternatives for system reconfiguration (e.g., a quad subsystem that reconfigures into a triad).
A system hierarchy is described by nondirectional tree graphs. Root nodes (identified by a circle)
represent the system or one of its subsystems. Other nodes (identified by a rectangle) represent one or more
identical subsystems or components.
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Figure2.8:Physicalhierarchyof themultiprocessor.
Figure 2.9: Physical hierarchy of tile printed circuit board subsystem type.
2.1.2.1 Physical
Physical subsystems can not be reconfigured, llowever, th[, failure of a physical subsystem does not preclude
the system from operating, as long as the system requirements are met.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 describe the physical hierarchy of the multiprocessor. Initially, the multiprocessor
contains six printed circuit boards, which belong to the same physical subsystem type. Each board contains
a processor, memory, and a watchdog timer.
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Figure 2.10: Logical hierarchy of the multiprocessor.
2.1.2.2 Logical
Logical subsystems can be reconfigured. Before component failures cause them to fail, they can recover
by replacing the failed components with spares. If there are not enough spares available, the system can
degrade to a lesser number of subsystems or a less redundant subsystem. When a logical subsystem fails,
the system also fails unless it can be reinitialized by a separate subsystem or component.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 describe the logical hierarchy of the multiprocessor. Initially, the multiprocessor
contains two processor triads, one memory triad, one watchdog triad, one transmit bus triad, one receive
bus triad, and one watchdog bus triad. These triads are each composed of three components of the same
type.
ARM will automatically determine what components are spares by comparing the external structure
with the logical hierarchy; any extra instances of components in the external structure, beyond what is
included in the logical hierarchy, will be assumed to be spare_. Therefore, from Figures 2.6 and 2.10 it will
be assumed that the spare components are: three memories, three watchdog timers, one transmit bus, one
receive bus, and one watchdog bus.
2.1.3 System Reconfiguration
The future system configurations are described in terms of tile reconfigurations allowed. A change in the
system's configuration in response to some event is defined as a reconfiguration. A reconfiguration occurs
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IFigure 2.11: Logical hierarchy of tile triad subsystem class.
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Figure 2.12: Reinitialization of the multiprocessor.
when the system is reinitialized because of a logical subsystem failure, or when the system degrades to a
lesser number of subsystems or a less redundant subsystem because there are no spares to replace a failed
component. After a certain time period the mission phase may change causing the system to reconfigure.
Reconfigurations are described by unidirectional graphs. The source nodes are the components and
subsystems (physical or logical) that must be active before the reconfiguration. The destination nodes are
the reinitialized system, or the logical subsystems that will be active after the reconfiguration, in place of
the logical subsystems identificd by the source nodes, l"ach edge is labeled with the name of a specification
that will provide the reconfiguration parameters.
Figure 2.12 describes the reinitialization of the multiprocessor by the watchdog triad. Figure 2.13
describes the degradation of the multiprocessor from two to one processor triad. The working processors in
the deactivated triad are assumed to become spares.
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2.1.4 Requirement
Degrade
Figure 2.13: Degradation of the multiprocessor.
The requirements of a system, subsystem, or performance level are defined as the minimum set of subsystems,
components, and performance levels needed. These levels are used to identify the nondegraded mode and
the various degraded modes of operation a system might have.
These requirements are described by one or more success trees. Root nodes (identified by a circle)
represent the system, one of its subsystems, or a performance level. Other nodes (identified by a rectangle)
represent one or more identical subsystems, a performance level, or one or more identical components. Their
advantages over fault trees are that: (a) they are more intuitive for a computer engineer concerned with
making the system work and not with how it can fail; and (b) a conservative reliability estimate is produced
if some modes of operation are left out of the success tree, because system failure is assumed for those modes
of operation, whereas an optimistic reliability estimate is produced if a failure mode is left out of a fault
tree.
The graphs in Figures 2.14 through 2.16 describe the system and subsystem requirements of the multi-
processor. This mult!processor can operate at one of two performance levels. To achieve full performance
(FP) both processor triads, the watchdog triad, and the memory triad must be operational. The require-
ments for degraded performance (DP) are the same except that only one processor triad is needed. The
components in the printed circuit board can operate as long as the memory on the board has not failed.
2.2 Parameters
The following subsections describe the parameter specification windows. Any time unit may be used for the
parameter values as long as it is the same one for all of them. The OK and CANCEL buttons in each window
save and discard the parameter changes made, respectively. Both buttons snake the window disappear.
Initially, numeric and selection parameters are assigned an appropriate default value. Probabilities
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Figure 2.14: Requirements of the multiprocessor.
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Figure'_AS: Requirement of the printed circuit board subsystem type.
Figure 2.16: Requirements of the triad subsystem class.
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defaulto oneorzerodependingonwhatis mostcommonlyused.Rates,means,andstandarddeviations
defaulttozero.Integerandselectionparametersdefaulto theirmostcommonlyusedvalues.
Insteadof values,numericparameterscanalsobegivenvariableidentifiersthat startwitha letterand
cancontainletters,underscores(_),andnumbers.Oneof thesevariablescanbegivenarangeasdescribed
inSubsection2.2.7.TheSUREprogramwillpromptforthevalueofvariableswithoutarange.
Numericparameterswill beassumedto be independentof thesystemstate.Thisassumptionis not
strictlytrue.However,it isoftenclosenoughinpracticeto beusedto simplifytheanalysis.
2.2.1 Active Component Failure
The active component failure parameters are shown in Figure 2.17 with example values. These are the only
parameters that are always required for each component type, the other parameters are optional. First is
the name of the component type.
Second is the probability (e) a fault in an active component of this type will be a single point of failure
for the system, either immediately or during the recovery process. This is equal to one minus the fault
coverage of an active component of this type.
Third is the probability (0) a fault in an active component of this type will be detected and correctly
isolated. Fourth is the exponential arrival rate ($) of permanent faults. The next two are the exponential
arrival and disappearance rates (r and 6) of transient faults. The last three are the exponential rates (w, 8,
and a) at which intermittent faults arrive, become benign, and become active again.
2.2.2 Spare Component Failure
The spare component failure parameters are shown in Figure 2.18 with example values. First is the name
of the component type.
Second is the failure rates factor used to indicate which type of spare this is. It is: zero for cold, in the
exclusive range of zero to one for warm, and one for hot. This failure rates factor is the spare's fraction of
the active component failure rates.
Third is the probability a fault in a spare component of this type will be a single point of failure for the
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Failure Parameters
Conponent Type:
Single Point Probability: _.000001
Detection Probability: _0.999999
IDterwittent:
Failure Rate: _Re-5
Benign Rate: _e3
Figure 2.17: Active component failure parameters.
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Co_po_ent Type:
Failure Rates Factor: _ I
S_gle Po_t Probability: _.000001
Detectable Fraction: _.9 [
Soft Fault Isolation Probability: _0.2
Detectio_ T_e Distril_tio.:
F.xponential _ General
Rate: _e3 I ]_ean: _e-3 J
Standard Deviation:
_1e-3 J
Figure 2.18: Spare component failure parameters.
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system, either immediately or during the recovery process. This is equal to one minus the fault coverage of
a spare component of this type.
Fourth is the fraction of faults that can be detected in a component of this type while it is a spare. Fifth
is the probability a soft fault can be isolated, before it disappears if it is transient or becomes benign if it is
intermittent, such that the faulty spare component can be reconfigured out of the system.
Soft fault isolation probabilities are assumed to be the same for transients and intermittents. This
assumption is not strictly true. However, it is often close enough in practice to be used to simplify the
analysis.
The sixth parameter indicates whether the detection time, of those faults that can be detected, follows
an exponential or general distribution. The next three parameters are the detection time: rate for an
exponential distribution, and mean and standard deviation for a general distribution.
2.2.3 Component Repair
The component repair parameters are shown in Figure 2.19 with example values. First is the name of the
component type. The second parameter indicates whether the repair time follows an exponential or general
distribution. The next three parameters are the repair time: rate for an exponential distribution, and mean
and standard deviation for a general distribution.
2.2.4 Subsystem Recovery
The recovery parameters are shown in Figure 2.20 with example values. First is the name of the subsystem
type. The second parameter is the probability (p) a soft fault can bc isolated such that the subsystem
can recover. The third parameter indicates whether the recovery time follows an exponential or general
distribution. The next three parameters are the recovery time: rate for an exponential distribution, and
mean (p) and standard deviation (a) for a general distribution.
Figure 2.21 illustrates the meaning of the failure and recovery parameters using a partial Markov model.
Except for states 0 and l, they all have additional transitions to additional states, neither of which are
shown. A transition that follows an exponential time distribution is labeled with a single expression that
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Repair T_e Distribution:
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Repair Parameters
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Figure 2.19: Component repair parameters.
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Recovery Par_eters
Soft Fault Isolatio_ Probability: _0.5
Recovery Ti_e Distribution:
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Figure 2.20: Subsystem recovery parameters.
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Key: State Description
no faults, n spares
system failed
1 permanent fault, n spares
1 transient fault, n spares
1 active intermittent fault, n spares
1 benign intermittent fault, n spares
1 permanent fault, n - 1 spares
1 transient fault, n - 1 spares
1 active intermittent fault, n - 1 spares
no faults, n - 1 spares
Figure 2.21: Partial Markov model of a processor duplex with n cold spares and no repair.
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repre_nts its rate. A transition that follows a general time distribution is labeled with three expre._qions
that represent the mean, the standard deviation, and the probability this transition will take place.
2.2.5 System Reconfiguration
The system reconfiguration parameters are shown in Figure 2.22 with example values. First is the specifica-
tion name. The second parameter indicates whether this reconfiguration is triggered by a logical subsystem
failure, a mission phase change, or a component in a logical subsystem failing without a spare. Third is the
name of the component type whose failure without a spare will trigger the reconfiguration. Fourth is the
probability a soft fault can be isolated such that the system can be reconfigured. The rest of the parameters
specify the combined time distribution of the reconfiguration and the mission phase change, if any.
2.2.6 Model Generation
The optional window shown in Figure 2.23 with default values allows a user familiar with the ASSIST
program, described in Section 1.2, to select which, if any, state space reduction technique is to be used
in generating the model and to specify any associated parameters. First is the optional ASSIST prune
condition, which is specified as a Boolean expression of the state variables. The second parameter indicates
the optional trimming method to be used. The last two parameters indicate whether the trim rate should
be selected automatically or manually, and the trim rate to be used when it is selected manually.
2.2.7 Model Evaluation
The optional window shown in Figure 2.24 with default values allows a user familiar with the SURE program,
described in Section 1.2, to specify parameters used in the evaluation of the model. First is the mission
time used for calculating the failure probability. Second is the number of times the SURE program will
go around a loop in the model before truncating its traversal. Third is the number of digits of accuracy
required. The SURE program will issue a warning if pruning and truncation result in an upper bound on
the failure probability that does not meet this accuracy requirement.
The next two parameters indicate whether the SURE prune level should be selected automatically or
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Reconfiguration Para_eter_
Specification Name: _Hestart
Triggering Event:
Logical SubsFste_ Failure
0 Nissio_ Phase Change
0 Co_ponent Failing without a Spare
Co_ponent Type: i"
Soft: Fattlt Isolation Probability: _O.S
Heco_fig_ratian Ti_e Distributio_:
Exponential 0 General
Bate: _e3 I ]_ean: [,,2.5e-4
Standard Deviatior :
Figure 2.22: System reconfiguration parameters.
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Model Generation Parameters
ASSIST Prune Condition:
Trinning _et_od:
Conbined _ith any Pruning
0 Separate fran m_F Pruning
0 off
Tr_ Rate Selection:
_to_atic 0
Tri_ Rate: _0 [
Figure 2.23: Model generation parameters.
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Model _aluati_ Patterers
_ission Time: _0
Loop Truncation Level:
Digits o_ _a_/Required:
Prune Level Selection:
Aut_atic 0
Level:
Variable N_e:
Figure 2.24: Model evaluation parameters.
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manually, and the prune level to be used when it is selected manually. ASSIST pruning affects which states
are generated, whereas SURE pruning affects which of the generated states are evaluated. If no SURE
pruning is desired, the SURE prune level selection should be manual and the prune level should be left at
its default value of zero.
The last two parameters are optional. They are used when the failure probability is to be calculated as
a function of a previously defined variable. In that case, the name of the variable must be given along with
its range. The range can be specified as:
! to h add i
where i and h are the low and high ends of the range and i is the increment added to vary the variable's
value over that range. The range can also be specified as:
I to h by f
where f is the multiplication factor used to vary the yariable's value over the range.
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Chapter 3
Example
The FTMP is composed of 10 line replaceable units (LRUs) and five buses that connect them. Each LRU
contains a processor (p), memory (m), clock (c), input/output port (to), and power supply (ps). Each bus
has five lines. A transmit bus (tb) line is used for a processor to transmit to a memory or input/output
port. A receive bus (rb) line is used for a processor to receive from a memory or input/output port.. The
processors and clocks communicate with components of their own type by using the poll bus (pb) and clock
bus (cb), respectively.
The components of the 10 LRUs are initially configured into three processor triads, two memory triads,
and one clock quad to provide full performance. The clock bus is initially configured as a quad but degrades
to a triad if two bus lines fail. If the clock bus degrades to a triad, the clock quad is also degraded to a
triad. Tile other buses are configured as triads from tile start.
The system requires two processor triads, two memory triads, and one clock quad or triad to provide
degraded performance. Each triad requires that two of its components be working for it to be operational.
Each quad requires that three of its components be working for it to be operational. Each LRU requires
that its memory, clock, input/output port, and power supply be working for it to be operational. If two
components in a triad or quad fail before one can be replaced by a spare, the system will crash.
When a component in a triad or quad fails it is replaced by a spare if available. Otherwise, quads degrade
into triads. If there are three processor triads, they degrade into two triads.
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Figure 3.1: External structure of the FTMP.
The architecture and requirements of the FTMP are described by Figures 3.1 through 3.10. The logical
hierarchy and requirements of the triad subsystem class are not shown since they are the same as those
shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.16, respectively. The parameters of the FTMP are not shown since they would
be specified using the same windows as those shown in Section 2.2.
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Figure3.2:Physicalhierarchyof theFTMP.
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Figure 3.3: Physical hierarchy of the LRU subsystem type.
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Figure 3.4: Logical hierarchy of the FTMP.
Figure 3.5: Logical hierarchy of the quad subsystem class.
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Figure 3.6: Degradation to less processor triads.
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Figure 3.7: Degradation to less clock redundancy.
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Figure 3.8: Requirements of the FTMP.
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Figure 3.9: Requirements of the LRU subsystem type.
Figure 3.10: Requirements of tile quad subsystem class.
45
Chapter 4
Conclusions
This paper has presented a general graphical user interface (GUI) for automatic reliability modeling of
processor-memory-switch structures using a Markov model. This GUI is based on a hierarchy of windows.
One window has graphical editing capabilities for specifying the system's communication structure, hier-
t
archy, reconfigurations, and requirements. Other windows have text fields, pop-up menus, and buttons
for specifying parameters and selecting actions. The application of the GUI was exemplified using the
Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor described in [LS83].
This GUI is to become the first of four steps in an automated reliability modeling process using a
Markov model. The second step, which we are implementing in the ARM program, will be automating the
specification of the model using the ASSIST language. The last two steps, automating the generation and
evaluation of the model, have already been implemented in the ASSIST and SURE programs.
Since the GUI is not specific to these programs, it could also be used as the front-end for other reliability
analysis programs. The advantages of the GUI approach are (a) utility to a larger class of users, not
necessarily expcrt in reliability analysis, and (b) a lower probability of human error in the computation.
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